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INTRODUCTION practice of identity politics, with what impact on their lives?
Rather than provide definitive answers to these questions, I frame the discussions they have generated, specify key divergences and areas of consensus, and chart the promising directions in which new research is headed. Throughout, I tack back and forth between the topic itself and the assumptions underlying anthropological analysis, drawing inspiration from others who have engaged in such critique (Coronil 1996, Kearney 1996, Taussig 1993, Williams 1989, Yuidice 1996, CA Smith 1997). By making intellectuals the objects of study as well, we keep the politics of anthropological theory on center stage and take fuller advantage of the "dual or multiple consciousness" that results (Harrison 1991) .
Justifiable and enlightening for nearly any body of literature, emphasis on the entanglement of the analyst's lens and topic of study is especially crucial in this case. On the one hand, the massive and widespread evidence for a shift in the character of oppositional politics in Latin America-the "explosion" of grassroots organizations (Castanieda 1993 up to the 1960s, identities were, in a sense, clearly defined and unproblematic. One knew who was who, so to speak, and how he or she was defined as a member of a group. One also knew what to do and how to do it (Development or Revolution, depending on one's perspective). But this is no longer true.
Assertions like this one cry out for hard-nosed historical and theoretical critique (e.g. Edelman 1996, Knight 1990). Such a neat before-after dichotomy, if relevant at all, could only reasonably apply to intellectuals well versed in paradigm hopping. When applied across the board, it leaves the distinct impression that the two realms how people enact politics and how analysts understand these enactments-have been seriously conflated. Even more to the point are efforts to read complex social and political processes through a few purportedly emblematic literary texts, which yield predictable portrayals of Latin American societies saturated with hybridity, multiplicity, and other so-called keywords of the shift to identity politics (e.g. de la Campa 1995). Such claims culminate in the idea that Latin America has always been hybrid (e.g. Chanady 1994), an assertion that, in its very incontestability, reinforces the suspicion that changing theoretical fashions play a major role in constituting their own subject. Yet many such critiques, instead of restoring analytical balance, often have left the debate hopelessly polarized. One need only sample the venom in the "forum" on Ahmad's (1992) work in Public Culture (Ahmad 1993), or reflect on the implications of Dirlik's (1994) provocative assertion that postcolonial theory came of age when third world intellectuals "arrived in First World academe," creating an "aura" that obscured the facilitating conditions of their arrival: i.e. class privilege and the "needs" of global capitalism (see also Lazarus 1991) . When these critics attempt to reduce all analysis informed by postmodem theory to self-absorbed ruminations and self-interested career moves, the argument rapidly takes on an "aura" of its own. Framed as a return to "materiality," these counterarguments often allow the real subject of analysis-people struggling from the margins to gain voice and power-to vanish into thin air.
My point of departure here is that this polarized divide-between postmodem theoretical innovation and materialist reassertion-has grown steadily less important, and less useful, as an organizing framework for recent scholarship on identity politics in Latin America. It would not be difficult to find work that exemplifies those entrenched, opposing poles: identities as performative acts, politics as purely discursive battles versus hard-bitten calls for a return to the fundamental role of class struggle in history; blanket assertions of a rupture that relegates all theory "before" to the status of "totalizing Eurocentric metanarrative" versus suspiciously totalizing efforts to cast the new theory as unwitting ideological accomplice of "global capitalism." Indeed, I refer to this polarization throughout the review because it is integral to the recent intellectual history of the topic. Yet I also recast this polarization as precisely that-historical background-for two reasons. First, the flaws inherent in each pole of the debate have become mutually enabling: They are propelled more by contention with one another than by sustained empirical engagement with the subject of study. Second, most of the interesting, forward-looking research already has set its sights squarely beyond this divide, incorporating insights from both sides while rejecting the extreme terms of the polarization itself. Although one might be tempted to understand the resulting theoretical resting place as a middle ground, a synthesis of the materialist thesis and the discursive antithesis, I contend that a more radical departure is under way. The most promising work not only offers new theories of politics but sets out to explore and implement a new politics of theory (Hall 1992 ): skeptical of both positivist theory-building and trendy, wheel-spinning theoretical self-referentiality; methodologically rigorous, yet fully aware that all claims to objectivity are ultimately situated knowledges (Haraway 1988); and most important, oriented toward reflexive political engagement, whether focused on "subaltems" who speak, read, and write for themselves, or on powerful institutions and actors who too often in the past have avoided anthropological scrutiny.
WHEN DID THE TURN TO IDENTITY POLITICS BEGIN?
Just as some recently have protested that anthropologists were "multiculturalists" long before the term became a lightning rod for US cultural politics (e.g. Weiner 1992), one might well claim that anthropology of Latin America was "on to" identity politics long before the phrase rose to its current heights of theoretical fashion. Consider, for example, two traditional areas of concentration in Latin American anthropology-peasants and indigenous peoples. If we juxtapose these to two key features associated with identity politics-local identities shaped by global forces (Appadurai 1995) , and politics as "struggles over [cultural] meanings at the level of daily life" (Escobar 1992a, p. 71; Franco 1992)-continuities come immediately to mind. At least forty years ago scholars began to place the analysis of the Latin American peasantry in a global context (Adams 1967 , Mintz 1974 , Wolf 1969 , and sensitivity to struggles over cultural meanings (at least at the local level) in indigenous societies goes back even further. Michael Brown has made this latter point recently, and all the more forcefully because his work on Amazonian Indian leaders highlights the "new politics of identity" in which they are immersed. Yet he concludes with a call for return to the fine-grained political ethnographies of times past, which addressed questions like: "In what ways is power created, used, negotiated, and thwarted by individuals in their daily lives?" (Brown 1993, p. 320; see also Watanabe 1996). Assuming that Brown is not using hindsight to artificially resuscitate the old masters, then the similarity between his and Escobar's descriptions is striking: What precisely justifies the adjective "new"?
Part of the answer lies in the process of rearticulation, whereby people find new means to collectively express and pursue interests, demands, and values that have long-standing importance to them. This implied emphasis on continuity must strike a delicate balance: neither imbuing people with timeless, essential motivations, nor assuming that these motivations come into being only when an organized effort first emerges to express them. In the case of indigenous politics, for example, we can acknowledge the diverse forms of resistance throughout the past 500 years and note that key issues of Indian identity addressed in the sixteenth century are still pertinent today (Silverblatt 1995 ). Yet we can also note that indigenous peoples now increasingly advance their struggles through a discourse that links Indian identity with rights to territory, autonomy, and peoplehood rights that run parallel to those of the nation state itself 3There is a related story of intellectual genealogy to be told on the emergence of "ethnicity" and its displacement of anthropology's previous term of preference, "tribe." A glance at the literature in the early 1960s reveals a striking absence of the term "ethnicity." Over the next two decades, it became ubiquitous. In the 1990s, "ethnicity" is clearly in decline, replaced on the one hand by various uses of the term "identity" and on the other by a renaissance of interest in racism, racialization, and racial identities. For a critical analysis of the "erasure" of race from anthropology's lexicon, see Harrison (1995 When the multiple subjects within the national-popular bloc claim their own separate rights, histories, and identities, however, this formula begins to unravel. Erosion of the national-popular project, and the crisis of intellectuals as mediators of its vision, may be the most reliable sign that identity politics have come to the fore. This implies not a stark rupture-a "before" when multiple identities fit neatly into broader categories, and an "after" when they did not; nor does it imply a uniform temporal logic, as in Wallerstein's (1995, pp. 1173, 1176) argument that the rise of identity politics can be linked to the "annunciatory and denunciatory world revolution of 1968," which starkly revealed the "total" contradiction of a world system. If we are to understand the emergence of multiple identities, then it hardly makes sense to reinscribe them within a framework in which particularity is derivative of universal, systemic forces and contradictions. The alternative logic of multiple historicities is what leads Fernando Coronil (1996) to refer to new social movements as the "spacialization of time"-that is, the claim to history emerging from a particular social location and adherence to the particular cultural political vision that follows.
Debates over the shift away from the national-popular are especially revealing in the case of the rebellion in Chiapas, which burst into the public eye in January 1994 (Nugent 1995 [T]oday we say ENOUGH IS ENOUGH. We are the inheritors of the true builders of our nation... .We will not die of hunger due to the insatiable ambition of a. ... clique of traitors ... the same ones that opposed Hidalgo and Morelos, the same ones that massacred the railroad workers in 1958 and the students in 1968....
Rather than choose between these two interpretations, we might read the ubiquitous national-popular rhetoric as another indication that the shift to identity politics has been consummated. So complete is the erosion of the nationalpopular that it can now stage a modest return, no longer as all-encompassing political project but as another decentered, rejuvenating (though perhaps debilitated?) voice from the margins.
WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE SHIFT?
Any reader who has dipped even superficially into the literature on the politics of identity in Latin America will have its descriptive features well enough in mind (e.g. Mato 1994). The move from descriptive listing to explanatory analysis of the transition is much less commonly found. Collier et al (1995) provide one piece of the puzzle, in an argument that focuses on the contradictions of liberal ideology more generally (e.g. Kristeva 1993, Rouse 1995a). They point to an inherent contradiction between the universal principle of equality and the persisting marginalization of those who do not fit within the universal categories through which equality is achieved (e.g. "citizen" or "abstract individual"). This contradiction engenders political change, however, because it creates the opportunity for marginalized groups to make claims in the name of bourgeois law, albeit at the risk of reproducing the very cultural logic that once oppressed them. A gradually broadening process of inclusion results, which Collier et al point to as the cultural-juridical underpinnings for the rise of "identity politics" in contemporary times. Yet they do not explain why this process would have such intensity today. Similarly, Nina Glick Schiller et al (1992), leading analysts of"transnationalism" and its implications for identity politics (also the focus of the journal Identities that Glick Schiller edits) conclude in a recent essay that, "The socially constructed nature of our entire repository of terms to define and bound identity-"nationality," "race," and "ethnicity"-has just recently begun to be scrutinized adequately by social scientists. And the implications of transnationalism for hegemonic constructions of identity have yet to be analyzed."
Arjun Appadurai ( , 1995 , though cogent in his critique of both "world-systems" and "comparative-historical" approaches (the former neglects "disjuncture" and the latter "interconnectedness"), and creative in coining terms that evoke present conditions (ethnoscapes, memoryscapes, etc), also finds rigorous explanation lacking. He notes that "a strong theory of globalization, from a sociocultural point of view, is likely to require something that we certainly do not now have: a theory of intercontextual relations which incorporates our existing sense of intertexts" (1995, p. 212). How then to explain the shift, to avoid telling the story from the Eurocentric center (Wallerstein 1995), while achieving a reasonably comprehensive account? How to proceed if existing analytical tools have been rendered inadequate for the job? Fredric Jameson's (1984, 1988) call for a "new cognitive mapping" has become a touchstone (or at least a de rigueur citation) for virtually everyone who confronts this problem, even if the resulting analyses lead in sharply contrasting directions. Jameson argues that it is wrong-headed to respond to postmodernism either with moral critique or as a cultural/theoretical option that one can embrace or reject. Instead, he takes the historical shift as a given and calls for a radically new framework to analyze "postmodern" phenomena like identity politics, combined with an insistence that the framework retain familiarly Marxist notions of causality, historical process, and, as Jameson puts it, the "social totality." Far from a flaw or contradiction, for some this combination enables rigorous explanation of the shift. Roger Rouse (1 995a,b), for example, employs a series of concepts-e.g. (im)migration circuits, transnational spaces of identity formation-that are explicitly linked to a Jameson-like notion of the postmodem logic of capitalism. Rouse argues that in the present era of "transnational" capitalism, the state and bourgeoisie have responded to political opposition by encouraging people to express discontent through the idiom of identity. The politics of identity that result are easily contained, because they rest on key premises of the bourgeois edifice that they purport to challenge and, fundamentally, because they derail much more potent forms of class-based antisystemic struggle (see also Friedlander 1976 Friedlander , 1986 Larsen 1995; Vilas 1994) Another group of theorists take up Jameson's call for a new cognitive mapping only after it is shorn of what Cornell West (rather provocatively) calls "a conception of totality" that "ultimately leads toward a Leninist or Leninist-like politics," a "crash course" of "pessimism" and "sectarianism" (from discussion of Jameson 1988; see also West 1986). Analysis from this perspective (e.g. Garcia Canclini 1995, Rowe & Schelling 1991) seeks an explanation for the rise of identity politics grounded in many accounts that emerge from particular social locations and historicities. As Laclau (1994, p. 1) observes "we are witnessing a proliferation of particularistic political identities, none of which tries to ground its legitimacy and its action in a mission predetermined by universal history-whether that be mission of a universal class, or the notion of a privileged race, or an abstract principle." To the extent that Laclau does offer an inductive explanation, it is carefully framed as a matter of "social dislocation" that leaves people without a "clearly defined location in the social structure," and feeling an "originary and insurmountable lack of identity," which together engender a great need to construct one (1994, p. 2-3). Laclau's recent writings illustrate what might be called a "discursivist" approach to the rise of identity politics. He does not neglect the role of capitalist transformation in the shift (the term "social dislocation" is a reference to precisely that), but the central analytical thrust lies in the crisis and undoing of the dominant ideological frames that previously had kept identities stable, well-defined, and beyond doubt, thereby allowing the "heterogeneity of the social" to burst forth. There is a principled refusal to explain why this discursive crisis is occurring now, because to do so would force a return to the universalist "mission" from which we have just been freed.
Yet while this theoretical polarity-between the insistence on social totality versus particularity-does help to sort out alternative explanations for the shift, its utility soon reaches a point of diminishing returns. In the first place, the closer to the ground the analysis gets, the more overlapping and mutually dependent these allegedly polarized theoretical perspectives begin to appear. Moreover, there is a common tendency at both poles to leave the consciousness and agency of actors themselves obscure, theoretically evoked rather than ethnographically examined. . This work is also distinguished-though in varying ways-by the goal of achieving a relationship of dialogue, exchange, and mutual critique with the subjects of research. Neither antitheoretical nor averse to generalization, these authors are mindful of the need to tell a story in which the protagonists might recognize themselves as such, rather than as pawns in someone else's theory wars. While it is too early to know whether a "new cognitive mapping" of the shift will emerge from such research, in the meantime we are learning a lot more about what identity politics mean in a series of specific times and places.
HOW CAN IDENTITY POLITICS BE CHARACTERIZED?
The first dimension of Latin American identity politics-extrapolating from Stuart Hall's (1988) influential essay-has as its key feature a challenge to the premise that a unified subject could "represent" (both "depict" and "speak for")-heterogeneous identities and social processes. This call for greater attention to what essentialism means and does in specific contexts is nicely illustrated in Joanne Rappaport's work on the politics of memory in a highland indigenous community of southern Colombia. Rappaport shows, for example, how the term recuperacion (repossession), around which the movement of indigenous militancy has crystallized, at times encompasses historical claims that could be considered essentialist, but at times also becomes "a gloss for economic innovation... regardless of whether these methods actually find their roots in the past" (1994, p. 11). This does not require one to abdicate critical analysis but proposes simply to acknowledge that the very category "essentialist"-and its supposed opposite "constructivist"-may be useful to track theoretical allegiances within the academy, but that it is insufficiently attentive to the range of ways that "essentialist" precepts are woven into political consciousness and practice, and the highly variable material consequences that result (see also Campbell 1994, Warren 1997).
Beyond noting these two dimensions in the contents of identity politics, we can also draw distinctions according to how specific political initiatives came into being. A first distinction is between subjects or identities that were once nominally included in national-popular political visions in name, even if suppressed in practice, versus those that have arisen anew, from outright neglect or suppression in the traditional political arena. Initiatives that fit the first category most clearly are those associated with the rights of women and racial or ethnic "minorities." National-popular political initiatives in contemporary Latin America invariably have made some provision for the "participation" of women in its ranks, developing some notion of the specific rights of women in the context of that initiative's overall political goals and vision. The same is true-if perhaps to a somewhat lesser extent-for the relationship with peoples of indigenous and African descent. These antecedents are crucial because they constitute a past involvement that shapes the subsequent contents of the initiative: an acknowledged debt to the Left for its role in propelling such activism, a growing frustration with the lack of responsiveness to specific political demands grounded in cultural difference, and an eventual break motivated by the perceived need for autonomy. In this sense, the longstanding debate on the problem of "double militancy (Schirmer 1997 , Wilson 1997 . While these arguably do have histories of recognition and validation within national-popular projects, they often are propelled by sharply discontinuous ideologies and political sensibilities. Human rights movements focused on the "disappeared," for example, often have emerged from discursive spaces created and validated by the dictatorships they oppose; such movements often put "conservative" premises-that women are inherently apolitical, that motherhood is inviolable-to the service of efforts to account for the missing, and to bring those responsible to justice (e.g. Perelli 1994).
A final category encompasses politics in the name of people who were once privileged signifiers of national-popular projects that have lost their allure.
One of the most ubiquitous slogans of the Sandinista revolution-"only the peasants and workers will reach the end (llegaran hasta elfinal)"-helps to make this point, if unintentionally. Peasants and workers are still around, still politically active, in some places dramatically so. But one would be hard pressed today to find a political initiative of national scope that makes peasants and workers the privileged signifier, as the Sandinistas did. These identities must now share the stage with a host of others, at best forming tenuous alliances, at worst competing for scarce international funds in an ideological climate where "Indian" causes are much more exciting and important than "peasant" ones, where funders lavish attention on any initiative with "gender" in the title yet consider workers' rights passe or even antisocial. Another prominent facet of this "decentering" is for studies of peasant or worker politics to address cross-cutting inequities of gender and race/ethnicity (Alonso 1995, Edelman 1994, Roseberry 1995, Stamn 1992, Stolcke 1988). It is striking then that a fine illustration of this new analysis-Michael Kearney's Reconceptualizing the Peasantry-would conclude that "class differences and differentiation remain the basic theoretical and political issue" (1996, p. 173). Not long ago such an assertion would have triggered accusations of complicity with homogenizing Marxist suppression of difference, yet in this context the phrase reads as a fresh insight, a touchstone in an effort that receives high praise even from "arch postmodernists" like George Marcus. Here is another sign of theoretical clearing, an opening for research on peasant politics finally freed from the twin orthodoxies that forced us to choose between class as the last-instance answer to all analytical questions, and class as the analytical question that never even gets asked.
OUTCOMES AND CONSEQUENCES
The prospects for a theoretical clearing seem least encouraging in regard to the question of consequences. It is one thing to approach a rough consensus on the emergence of a shift, its explanation, and characterization, and quite another to do so on assessments of the consequences: what people engaged in various forms of identity politics have achieved, and can hope to achieve, with what impact on their daily lives. Here, major divergences on key concepts of power, resistance, hegemony, and structural transformation tend to surface, producing a chasm that would seem difficult to bridge. The strongest argument for the "creative renewal" potential of identity politics resides in the intrinsic value of decentralized and multifaceted political activity, a rejuvenation of the political engendered by transformations in the very meaning of "doing politics." This involves not only expanding and diversifying what counts as political-calling into question the dichotomy between public and (allegedly nonpolitical) private spheres, for example-but also innovation in the realm of strategy and tactics. The term "subversion" sheds its former meaning of "conspiring against the system" and refers instead to the art of working at the interstices, finding the inevitable cracks and contradictions in the oppressor's identity, discourse, or institutional practice, and using them to the subaltern's advantage. Even the "fragmentation of identity" and the "alienation of the self' that often come with living on the margins can be reinterpreted in this light: No longer symptoms of oppression, they can become key resources in moving toward a "third space" of "multidimensional political subjectivity" beyond the Manichean contra position of oppressor and oppressed (Bhabha 1990, de Lauretis 1990).
Yet it is not necessary to go to the extreme of celebrating fragmentation and alienation to make the case. In his critique of development, for example, Escobar (1995) offers an intriguing hypothesis that fits nicely with the "interstices" argument. Groups with greater insertion in the market, Escobar suggests, have better chances of "affirming their ways of life" (presumably by exploiting opportunities from within) than those "clinging" to conventional identities and strategies predicated on resistance from outside the political economic system. Another example is the much-needed revisionist work on the politics of conversion from Catholicism to evangelical Protestantism (Brusco 1995 , Burdick 1993 , Stoll 1990 . Dispelling simplistic recourse to the ideological thralldom of these new religions, these analyses point to the spaces opened-for women s assertion against abusive men, for more participatory religious practice-to explain the shift. Similarly, Diane Nelson's (1996) phrase "Maya hacker" refers (among other things) to how Maya cultural activists in Guatemala have found ways to hack out a space within the national political arena, subverting the traditional-modern dichotomy that has always been used against them, and at the same time helping to dispel the impression that they are engaged in radical, frontal opposition to "the system." From one standpoint, the "material consequences" of such political initiatives are self-evident and extensive. Merely to name forms of inequality that previously had no place in the realm of politics is in itself highly significant. The vibrancy, and in some cases substantial gains, of indigenous and women's movements throughout Latin America speak volumes on the benefits that accrue when particular identities become politicized and break out from under the tutelage of the national-popular. It is especially clear that the PanAmerican indigenous movement is "gaining ground" as the title to a recent special issue of NACLA announces (see also, for example, Van Cott 1994). Even references to the "revitalization of civil society," though often vague and difficult to assess in a rigorous manner, point to processes that must be taken seriously. Yet it is striking that analyses in this vein are so circumspect on the question of consequences, especially in the relation to enduring political and economic inequities. In regard to new social movements, the unmediated enthusiasm has passed, replaced by more sober assessments of advances and setbacks, more carefully worded provisos that their political character "is not given in advance" but rather "rests on the articulations they may establish with other social struggles and discourses" (Escobar 1995, p. 221). Kay Warren, in a cogent and comprehensive analysis of the Maya movement and its challenge to the "unified social movement" paradigm, similarly concludes that "it is too early to know what sort of impact the Pan-Mayan movement...will have" (Warren 1997, p. 45). While in many ways it surely is too early, this conclusion also highlights a broader dilemma: discarding the "unified social movement" paradigm also means discarding unified criteria through which "impact" used to be assessed. Developing new criteria, which neither suppress nor uncritically defer to the claims of the movement itself, is a task that research on identity politics is just now beginning to confront.
In Young 1995) , I have investigated the dilemmas and contradictions that result when the ostensibly progressive theories of "hybridity" and "mestizaje" travel to Guatemala and are used by elites to delegitimate Maya cultural activism (Hale 1996) . Mindful of Foucault-influenced critiques of resistance (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1990, Brown 1996), Edmund T Gordon (1 998a) has suggested that we work harder to draw analytical distinctions between different forms of resistance rather than jettisoning the entire concept. Finally, many scholars have argued for a more fully dialectical analysis of the global context of local resistance movements. They acknowledge the contestatory potential of movements that emerge from the interstices of the capitalist system, while at the same time pointing to the formidable limits set by that system, not so much as external constraints but as forces that constitute the very precepts on which the local itself has been predicated (Dirlik 1996a, Friedman 1990, Miyoshi 1993). Such questionings are especially constructive when they have been influenced, even partly constituted by, theoretical insights implicit in the phrase "cultural politics of difference." Then their insistence on analysis of material consequences rings true. In part reflections of theory-war fatigue, such convergences also arise from a novel set of material settings that form the underpinnings of intellectual production itself. It is therefore fitting to conclude by once more making intellectuals themselves the focus of analysis.
Following Yuidice (1996), Franco (1994), and others, I have suggested that the erosion of the national-popular has also entailed a crisis among Latin American intellectuals. A major task that this points to, but does not complete, is the systematic comparative analysis of US and Latin America-based intellectuals' responses to this crisis. I do argue that past theoretical polarities-between materialist and discursive analysis, between emphasis on social totality and particularity-have declining utility as organizing principles of such responses. This would seem to be the perspective of a third "critical modernist" position, exemplified in the work of Argentine literary critic Beatriz Sarlo (1993). The age of postmodern identity politics, for Sarlo, far from providing the basis for celebratory renewal, most accurately reflects the combined effects of commercialism and media-saturated superficiality, a politics that, having lost a sense of "scale and distance," has been reduced to "icon, image, or simulacrum." Yet her stance toward Marxist analysis, socialist politics, and the former role of the national-popular intellectual is equally critical: Gone are the days when these intellectuals could present themselves as a vanguard with a "special role of explaining the big picture" (vocacion generalizadora) derived from the combination of broader vision and organic links to the social. In Sarlo's appraisal, intellectuals with political ambitions have nowhere to turn: They either resign themselves to obscurity and irrelevance, join the wave of privatization and become "experts," or parlay their skills in social analysis into cultural capital that wins them positions in neoliberal governments (e.g. Arturo Warman of Mexico, FH Cardoso of Brazil, JJ Brunner of Chile). Sarlo finds a limited defense against hopelessness in cultural criticism, which rests on the reassertion of aesthetic and ethical values, if not political or theoretical solutions.
Compelling in analytical acuity and in the ability to place intellectual production (including her own) in historical context, Sarlo's resting place, as Jean Franco (1994, p. 21) notes, "cannot be disentangled as easily as she would wish from the exclusionary and elitist culture of modernism." What would happen, though, if the implications of Sarlo's analysis were carried in a different direction, instead of withdrawal into the rarefied space of cultural criticism, toward direct engagement with political actors who confront the "crisis of modernity" in all its mundane, contradictory, oppressive daily manifestations? This would entail a modest form of political engagement, as skeptical as the actors themselves are apt to be of grand ideologies, political visions, or theoretical statements that neatly link local struggles to "broader realities." Within Latin America, intellectual production positioned in this way is especially apt to go unnoticed beyond the local context, precisely because the facilitating material conditions for communication of the resulting ideas are largely absent. US-based anthropologists enjoy advantages on this score, though economic privilege and northern provenance make engagement more difficult and perhaps inherently contradictory. Despite such problems, this locally engaged "critical modernist" approach is a useful place to start in building a broader analysis of identity politics, beyond the theoretical polarization of the previous moment.
One way to track this emergent trend is to look not only at theoretical allegiances but also at how the research itself is carried out. This brings into focus, for example, new forms of experimentation with collaboration and dialogue with the subjects of research, and with local organic intellectuals (Escobar et al This empirically driven, theoretically seasoned, and politically engaged work on identity politics in Latin America offers a potential source of rejuvenation for anthropology more generally. The crisis of oppositional intellectuals in Latin America and the crisis of "ethnographic authority" among USbased anthropologists run parallel to each other. Among both groups, the role of intellectuals as intermediaries who provide data on, interpret, and theorize about the subjects of identity politics, is confronting an ever more serious challenge. How intellectuals respond to this challenge becomes an analytical and political question in its own right. Deprived of easy claims to "organic ties" with political actors "on the ground," deprived of fieldwork sites with docile, cooperative subjects, one common recourse in both cases is to withdraw. Yet the challenge also creates a mandate for reinvention: a call for intellectuals to develop methods and analytical categories that engender more constructive engagement with the multiple inequalities that organize the worlds we live in and study. This may at least help to prevent scenarios in which theoretical debate, though presenting itself as a few steps ahead of political practice, descends into self-referentiality. It will at least keep theory and activism engaged with each other, and in the best of cases could even produce ethnography that casts some light on the problems and opportunities that lie ahead. Literature Cited
